JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. Department of Philosophy University of California, San Diego I argue for accepting a pluralist approach to species, while rejecting the realism about species espoused by P. Kitcher and a number of other philosophers of biology. I develop an alternative view of species concepts as divisions of organisms into groups for study which are relative to the systematic explanatory interests of biologists at a particular time. I also show how this conception resolves a number of difficult puzzles which plague the application of particular species concepts.
1. Introduction. The argument of this paper proceeds in two steps. The first establishes that we ought to be pluralistic with respect to species concepts: that is, no single ground for drawing species divisions has exclusive authority. I make this case by pointing out independent and legitimate explanatory demands in biology which require distinct conceptions of species and classificatory schemes.
The second step of the argument shows that this pluralism is incompatible with a realist view of species. More specifically, I show that the grounds which should make pluralists of us all prevent us from being realists. The explanatory interests of biologists define the legitimate species concepts at any particular time, and these have changed dramatically over the course of history without corresponding changes in the physical world they classify. Thus, our resources for crafting a pluralism we can live with will not allow us to regard the species it generates as real. I conclude by demonstrating how abandoning a realist view of species renders impotent a set of conceptual difficulties which arise in applying particular species concepts. The dissolution of these puzzles is a final com-pelling piece of evidence that we would be better off with around this particular bit of realist luggage.
2. A Plea for Pluralism. Let us begin with Philip Kitcher (1984a,b; 1987) for pluralism. Although his is only one am of pluralist positions (e.g., Ruse 1973, Mishler and Donog Kitcher' s arguments are compelling and particularly releva per. Kitcher (1984b) diagnoses the troubles of monism. The hi cies concepts, he suggests, is a succession of proposals de commodate different kinds of biological inquiry. The de maintain that their species concept serves the needs of all vestigation (see Naef 1919 , cited in Hennig [1950 , 3 1987 ; this latter claim is fundamentally misguid
As an instructive example, Kitcher considers Mayr's Bi cies Concept (BSC), which claims that " [s] pecies are group breeding natural populations that are reproductively isolated f such groups" (Mayr 1976, 518) . According to Kitcher, thi of species is ideal for considering some important kinds questions, such as distinguishing groups of sympatric, mo similar, but noninterbreeding organisms, but is not at all usef biological contexts, for instance, when one is interested in pal evidence or asexual populations. These difficulties have led to consider asexual organisms to be "aberrant cases" (cite 1984b) or to recognize their importance, but deny that th species (Mayr 1987) . Mayr further acknowledges that spec provisions must be made for the ecologist. Perhaps unintentio showcases the principal failing of monism by identifying ological interests which are not served by the BSC.
Kitcher views the case of the BSC to be merely symptom problems of monism as a strategy for classification. The presu "there is a fundamental feature of organismic diversity, c groups of organisms" (1984b, 318-319) is misguided. The biologists indicates a number of important patterns of biologi and a number of independent interesting questions about o their relationships to one another. Kitcher concludes that s concepts are required.
Specifically, Kitcher divides biological investigation into str historical questions. Neither inquiry is prior to nor more fun the other, and each further subdivides into variations appropr nificantly different biological explanatory demands. For ex tural concepts of species might focus specifically on exa monalities of genetic or chromosomal structure, or of d programs. Historical concepts employ criteria of reproduct ecological distinctness or morphological distinctness. This actually provides a potentially infinite set of morphologica cepts, each relative to some precise degree and respect of similarity. The difficulty is not fatal, however, as precisely t eral criteria of acceptability developed in section 3 for ev proposal for dividing organisms can be applied to specific and of morphological division. My claims do not depend upon any particular scheme; thus, "morphological species conc blanket term covering any proposal created by dividing or respect to some particular anatomical or physiological feat precise degree of similarity.
Each of these three historical interests is subordinated either to a consideration of the main types of evolutionary discontinuity between species or to a principle of grouping organisms by recency of common ancestor. Kitcher claims that each of the nine species concepts so generated (three structural and six historical) represents a legitimate biological explanatory demand and that each demand necessitates the use of its corresponding species concept. To privilege any one of these explanatory demands and force all other investigations to take place on its terms is a mistake. The BSC, for example, will not provide a useful framework for distinguishing relevant similarities between organisms when one is interested in independent, legitimate questions about their morphology, or as we saw earlier, for any interesting questions at all about groups of asexual organisms.
Let us now consider Kitcher's central claim: that certain explanatory demands are inextricably bound to certain species concepts. We might ask whether rejecting this claim will merely pare our conceptual tools down to one (or a few) which does the same work as Kitcher's nine species concepts. The question is whether Kitcher's tool box is filled with various wrenches, pliers, and screwdrivers or merely with nine hammers.
Desirable as the simplicity of a single or just a few species concepts would be, it seems unattainable without abandoning many of the powerful explanatory resources of modem biology. This is because when one is interested in some feature exhibited systematically by organisms, it is best to divide up the objects under study with respect to that feature, and a division based upon something else will often hinder the inquiry. We have no reason to suppose that organisms will segregate into exactly the same 'Mayr's BSC is, however, nondimensional. Thus, species concepts which employ criteria of reproductive isolation are historical because they are particularly well suited to addressing historical (e.g., evolutionary) questions, not because the concepts themselves have some inherently historical dimension. groups with respect to every biologically interesting feature and I show that, as a matter of fact, they do not.
Let me begin by acknowledging the dramatic explanatory a of the BSC in the investigation of reproductive relations amo occurring populations. This approach to species has illum classes of explanatory enterprises, including (among others) m ulation biology, the phenomena of gene flow, speciation ripheral isolates, founder effects, and the nature and ada reproductive isolating mechanisms themselves. A more sp of the explanatory success of the BSC is the identification tively isolated sibling species of Anopheles mosquitos, w to successfully account for the distribution of malaria in classic case of evolutionary explanation (see Mayr 1963) .
The BSC, with its criterion of reproductive isolation, was a important resource in the Anopheles case. The sibling sp quitos are similar morphologically and inhabit overlapping ra ther a morphological nor an ecological criterion of species have been of much use in attempting to unravel this particu But it is equally clear that there are explanatory contexts i BSC is highly problematic. As noted above, a criterion of isolation is of little practical use in reconstructing the phylo cies based upon paleontological evidence, and is completely explaining anything about asexual organisms. The latter ca problematic, since morphological and ecological features cannot be taken to be possible indicators of reproductive isol might in the case of paleontological evidence. This problem robust than is usually recognized, as asexual reproduction to prokaryotes, but is the normal form of reproduction in fu such as Penicillium, in a great many plants such as Rubus and in several groups of animals, such as the bdelloid roti 1979). The BSC is literally powerless when confronted wit isms, which are therefore organized for investigation on and ecological grounds. Hybridization between taxonomic species poses another the BSC. This difficulty is sometimes dismissed or ignore cause of the rarity of hybridization among mammal spec tion, however, occurs with significant evolutionary conseque terflies, in leaf hoppers, in fishes, and in many kinds of natural hybrids are given by Gray 1958 and 1954 for both bi mals, respectively, while reviews of natural hybridization 1955 , Mayr 1963 , Remington 1968 , and Moore 1977 . In t dom, however, hybridization achieves full generality: natura hybrids are found in every major plant group, and are co higher plants (see Grant 1981 , part 5, for a fuller discussio ization in plants, including the California white oak synga thermore, many plant hybridizations regularly produce (as in number of animals) nonsterile and even fully fertile offsprin duction of fertile offspring often results in the formation of h that is, highly variable, but stable populations consisting o the two parent species, hybrids, and the offspring of hybrid with the parent species. An even more complex arrangeme gameon, in which natural hybridization links anywhere fr very large number of species together in one inclusive interb For all its complexity, the syngameon is relatively common western American flora, for example, syngameons often occu quently than well-defined biological species (ibid., 74).
The BSC is, of course, of little taxonomic help for hybri syngameons. In the syngameon, we find species in continu reproductive interaction with large numbers of other species they are sometimes morphologically and ecologically complete
In the California syngameon of white oaks (Quercus), for garryana, a forest tree with deeply cleft leaves, and Q. d shrub with small spiny leaves occurring in arid chaparral linked by direct hybridization.
Reproductively, a syngameon behaves like a biological s reproductively isolated from other syngameons and other wel ological species. However, the considerable morphological cal differences between the component members of syngameo to their classification as distinct taxonomic species, despit reproductive isolation. This supports the contention that t pendent, biologically interesting questions about the mor ecology of organisms which do not turn on the issue of repro lation. Similarly, we sometimes have good reasons to draw divisions on the basis of such morphological and ecologica rather than restricting ourselves to a single principle of phyl vision which sometimes applies, but sometimes does not. I terested in the anatomy or physiology of organisms, whet cipled way to draw phylogenetic divisions or a question of interest, it would seem to be a grave error, not to mention an and frustrating impediment to a systematic vocabulary, t tree with deeply cleft leaves and an arid-dwelling shrub with in the same basket. What conclusions might we derive abo ology and morphology of the "leaves" of such a chimera? O should do what plant biologists have already done, and d within syngameons on morphological and ecological grounds, not apologize for abandoning the BSC in explanatory enterpri it is merely a hindrance. We should not, however, believe phological species concept can replace the BSC wholesale, already noted significant explanatory achievements, like t mosquito, to which the BSC was clearly more useful than logical principle of species division might have been.
Hybridization pleads a particularly interesting case for the u ecological principle of species division. Some species live sy without hybridizing in some areas, but form full hybrid swar When such situations occur, the hybridization is frequent with disturbed habitats (Futuyma 1979) . For instance, Iris ganticaerulea lives in exposed tidal marshes, while I. fulva l stream banks and in woods. In undisturbed natural habitats, t sympatrically and do not hybridize. In disturbed habitats, two produce partially fertile, introgressive (backcrossing) spring with various combinations of characteristics from the cies; populations of this hybrid occur in swampy areas lumbere by humans (Riley 1938) . Here hybridization gives us a re criminate species on a principle of ecological division. Repr lation is clearly inadequate (this is a fertile hybrid which back the parent populations), and morphological differences are helpful, as the hybrid population contains widely varying of the morphological characteristics of the original species. Th sistent mechanism for discriminating these three groups of org to be the ecological niche they inhabit.
An ecological principle of division proves even more plaus sonable in an ecological explanatory enterprise. For instanc wish to know what it is about each of these three groups w it to inhabit the niche it does. If so, the morphological differ hybrid forms become relatively unimportant, as do the repro lations between all three groups, and it seems natural to groups for study by the niche each occupies. Such an enqu be crucial to understanding the phylogeny of the organisms i for instance, in investigating how the geographical isolating m between these two Irises evolved in the first place.
While the advantages of identifying species by niche are case, the niches themselves are difficult to identify, and an equally legitimate conceptions of niche may apply to the ecological circumstances. In addition, niches are not fine-gr to individuate species in the absence of genealogical conside points out another advantage of the pluralist approach in that the combination of grounds for individuating species in c ecological one. After all, the classificatory apparatus involved one biological interest need not always hamper the pursui When individuating ecological species, it seems best to co occupation as a further refining principle used in conjunct nealogical considerations. Different principles of division a incompatible, and can sometimes be used together to grea this should further convince us of the wisdom of legitima classificatory strategies.
Of course, the ecological species concept has its own lim problem cases. Independently interesting questions of ecology cases arise in which ecological considerations are simply or the evolutionary history of particular speciation events. Furth ecological species concept seems to be of no help in discrim very distinct kinds of organisms. For instance, when insta ciation occurs in plants by the formation of polyploid offspr reproductively isolated from the parent species, the ecol concept seems powerless to distinguish the two kinds of nevertheless, they are different in important and systema other problem for the ecological species concept occurs in the the laboratory manufacture and manipulation of organisms: H no well-defined ecological niches for sorting organisms; never may have good grounds for wishing to distinguish such or each other and from naturally occurring varieties.
The examples considered do not constitute an exhaustive ological explanatory interests and their associated species c have gone a considerable distance, however, in empirically my claim that in order to study a particular feature exhibited cally by organisms, a classification based upon that featur be most helpful. Perhaps more importantly, these example claim that organisms do not segregate into identical group to each of their biologically interesting features; thus, we hav dent and legitimate explanatory interests in biology which re concepts of species. For classification to be of most assista ical investigation, we must recognize this and legitimate a var sificatory schemata. Even if we consider only Kitcher's his concepts, he provides six different criteria for individuating each of which appears to serve a distinct explanatory interest While his toolbox might turn out to contain a spare wren Kitcher's tools are plausibly heterogeneous and his demand well-founded.
It is worth emphasizing that we could, of course, simply "stick to our guns". We might say that reproductive isolation (for instance) is just al that there is to being a species, come hell or high water, and member of syngameons, paleontologists and blackberries be damned. We might even soften this a bit and roll out the epicycles of "semispecies", "mi-crospecies", "subspecies", "polytypic species" and "incipient The point of these examples and my discussion, however, is strate that we hobble significant investigations in biology by lim conceptual and taxonomic resources in this way. We should cept the insights of pluralism, and legitimate a variety of criter systematic division of organisms.
3. Biological Interests. Pluralist virtues are only part of the stor (1984b) thesis is that " [s] pecies are sets of organisms related other by complicated, biologically interesting relations" (p. 3 sis added). That divisions must be "biologically interesting" because Kitcher inherits the pluralist's traditional difficulty: rep Mayr (1987) , he recognizes the need to prevent pluralism fr mating the "suggestions of the inexpert, the inane, and the insan 1987, 190; original emphasis). While he holds that privilegi criterion for dividing organisms into species is too restrictiv not allow just anything to constitute a species division. Wh requires is a defense of moderate pluralism.
Kitcher's suggestion is that organisms have a whole host of pr and that different legitimate groupings can be made on the basi ferent properties. The danger is that the division of organisms based on any property will be legitimate (e.g., organisms wit those without) and that these groups must count as species. were to require legitimate classifications to be hierarchically (like our own), we could easily envision a taxonomy based up of locomotion" wherein higher divisions might correspond to ha a flagellum, legs, wings, having no means of locomotion at forth. Middle-level taxa (e.g., in the "legs" group) could disti into unarticulated and articulated varieties, and low-level tax dividuate, for example, on the basis of number of legs.2 Alt taxonomy is based on a real biological property, we would n call the groups thereby formed biological "species". (For those w this conclusion, I point out that this taxonomy seems unable such distinct organisms as spiders and crabs, or mice and Tri virtually any plants from any other or from sessile animals into different species without introducing additional criteria.)
Kitcher claims that dividing organisms on the basis of "m comotion" is not grounded in any biologically interesting re 2The proposed "locomotion taxonomy" is not historically ridiculous. Linn system" classified plants by the morphology of their reproductive organs however, that no change in the morphology of reproductive organs was possib fore, that the taxonomic strategy he proposed would lead to further discover plant kingdom (Goerke [1966 (Goerke [ ] 1973 thus limits the division of organisms along any property into species concepts by introducing a further refining criterion, atory interests of biologists. However, this cannot do the work demands. Claiming that species divisions must be "biologic ing" merely pushes the problem back one step; it does not interests qualify. More specifically, it does not provide groun the interests of (for example) ecologists and physiologists those of pheneticists and Creationists, as Kitcher would ve to do. We must specify more concretely whose interests const imate species divisions.
Kitcher and others provide the raw materials for a more th fense of pluralist moderation. Kitcher (1993, chaps. 3 and and defends an account of two kinds of scientific progress: pr cognitive. Practical progress is directed broadly at "the re estate": predicting and controlling the natural world. Cogn further subdivides into conceptual and explanatory varieties.
tempting to think that improving our classifications of or under the former category, for "[c]onceptual progress is m adjust the boundaries of our categories to conform to kinds a are able to provide more adequate specifications of our ref [95] [96] . I argue in sections 5-7 that this approach is indef stead, pluralists' best strategy for defending moderation is to species divisions are related to explanatory progress.
For Kitcher, explanatory progress "consists in improving the dependencies of phenomena" (ibid., 105). He takes it as commonplace that some phenomena depend on others, and capturing this explanatory order is the goal of our schemata, eral argument patterns which articulate the dependencies. In biology, for example, the common possession of a trait by can be explained by establishing that (1) the species are des a common ancestor, (2) the ancestor possessed the trait, (3 heritable, and (4) no factors intervened to modify the trait al logenetic sequences leading from the ancestor to the descen This general explanatory schema of common descent can b peatedly to explain diverse cases of the possession of some ide acteristic by separate species. An explanation of some particul enon, then, is a schema with its variable terms filled in with th being explained and the specific features of the world upon w pends (ibid., 82-83).
For Kitcher, "our account of the structure of nature . . . [is in the schemata of our practices" (ibid., 106). These schem ter" or "worse" insofar as they capture dependencies: eithe objective order of dependency of phenomena in nature (f metaphysical realist) or part of an ideal system for organizing the ph nomena (for the less metaphysically strong-minded). Progress occurs whe we abandon worse schemata for better.
His discussion of explanatory progress leads Kitcher directly into what is most useful to the defender of pluralist moderation: the account erotetic progress, progress in the questions that we ask. Questions a directly related to schemata, Kitcher claims, in that questions acquire in trinsic significance when answers to them would exhibit the possibi of instantiating an accepted schema (especially in apparently problematic circumstances) or would show the possibility of some controversial p supposition of an accepted schema. Kitcher goes on to point out a furthe important and often-neglected feature of erotetic progress: that we pro gress when we render questions more tractable.
This, I claim, is precisely the important role in the progress of scienc played by species concepts. Species divisions are the handmaidens o erotetic progress: They enable us to make the significant questions thro which we extend successful schemata more tractable. To briefly revi we improve explanatory practice by invoking schemata which fasten ont dependencies obtaining between natural phenomena. Erotetic progres obtained by asking significant questions which extend, apply, or def the presumptions of our increasingly successful schemata, and spec concepts are accepted or rejected, I suggest, insofar as they render s significant questions more tractable.
This account of progress suggests various grounds on which the m erate pluralist might reject a proposed species division. First, a prop to divide organisms into species by certain criteria might be redund That is, it might fail to make any significant question more tractab indeed, the monist claims that all species divisions, save one, are red dant.
Second, a proposed species division might simply be boring. That it might advance a schema which fastened onto some dependencies nature, but these dependencies might not help us to pursue further goa This is the problem with the "means of locomotion" taxonomy: Sur something about organisms depends only upon their means of locom tion, but it is unlikely to be anything useful. This should not be confus with the claim that knowing the means of locomotion of a particular an imal cannot be useful. The point is rather that no especially helpful pendencies can be detected which obtain solely or primarily in virtu animals' means of locomotion (e.g., the further properties possessed all and only animals with four, articulated legs). We suppose that answers to questions about all animals employing a particular means locomotion will be too vague, general, obvious, and unrelated to th evolutionary trajectories to provide us with any helpful guidance in pre dicting and controlling the world, or in describing its plau In Kitcher's terms, a boring species division makes no practic Finally, a proposal to divide organisms might be wron renders tractable significant questions whose schemata in positions we believe are incorrect. In this case the specie rejected not because it fails to make questions advancing a tractable, but because that very schema is misguided.
If there is a case against pheneticism, it seems to depend up that its species concept is boring: That is, the natural depend tified by the pheneticist's Operational Taxonomic Units a unhelpful in pursuing any practical end. The opponents o are more likely to claim that Creationism is wrongheaded its explanatory schemata rest upon substantially mistaken tions. The strength of the evidence for or against these cl termine the acceptability of pheneticist or Creationist species erate pluralist. If pheneticist species divisions are useful legitimate explanatory schemata, for instance, the moderate have good grounds for accepting them.
We have now made concrete sense out of Kitcher's presc acceptable species must stand in "biologically interesting" proposed division must render more tractable questions wh tend a successful explanatory schema, and it must be neither boring, nor wrongheaded. In what follows, I use the expre ically interesting" in this technical sense.
Nothing about the defense of moderation, however, dep cepting Kitcher's view of scientific progress. Alternative a tionality and progress are available, for instance, in the w Lakatos, L. Laudan, and S. Toulmin, and any of these view grounds for excluding certain concepts of species even w "rationally" or "progressively" accept more than one. Fo Laudan's account of scientific progress justifies accepting cies concepts which systematize organismic diversity most ef the resolution of various conceptual and empirical problem species concepts, according to Laudan, might differ from tho on Kitcher's account. In general, any account should prov grounds for making determinations, and thus for excludin tions of the "inexpert, inane and insane", even in the wak oughgoing pluralism regarding species.
4. Pluralism and Realism. Grounding judgements about w divisions are biologically interesting in some account of r progress emphasizes their historical relativity. That is, judgem is biologically interesting can only be made relative to a p and theoretical context. In my extension of Kitcher's acc ample, judgements about what species divisions are bori headed will necessarily involve evaluating which natura are most relevant to pursuing our practical goals and whi schemata rely upon substantially mistaken presupposition judgements can only be made with respect to a particula contingent set of practical goals and in the context of a part theoretical background. Thus, we should expect to encoun taxonomic divisions which were biologically interesting a thus constituted legitimate species concepts), but would n Similarly, some moder species divisions would rightly h jected as biologically uninteresting, given the practical g retical presuppositions of biology in the past.
Consider the explanatory enterprise and associated spec Georges Cuvier at the turn of the nineteenth century. Cu were nonevolutionary: Each species represented all of the the first pair created by God, and no changes in the functio icant characteristics of species were possible (Coleman 1 This was because certain necessary functional relationsh "conditions of existence") had to obtain between the vari tems of creatures if they were to function and survive in th only certain combinations were possible in actual organis these conditions of existence required a "correlation of p ganism, which precluded the transmutation of a species: that if any of an organism's functioning parts were modifie could no longer exist (ibid., 67-68).
Cuvier's chief explanatory interest was functional anat classic studies in this subject resulted from his attempt to d pletely general "anatomical rules" governing the correlati conditions of existence in all organisms. These laws were portance to Cuvier because he believed that while organi exist with those combinations of organ systems precluded b ical rules, all of those which were possible actually exist ganism. Thus, Cuvier believed that we could deduce, with certainty, what organisms and organ systems actually ex anatomical rules governing which were possible (ibid., 6
Cuvier's species concept made the extension of his explanat tractable: The immutability of God's species under the co istence and the necessary existence of all possible combin tional characters served to underwrite the possibility of tively valid nomological claims regarding functional an organisms. And it is equally clear that this explanatory prac successful: Cuvier actually managed to explain and predic acteristics of organisms by appealing to rules governin interconnections of their organ systems (see ibid., chap more, neither this explanatory practice, nor the specie quired, were wrongheaded at the turn of the nineteenth c about species which render it wrongheaded by contempora functional anatomical relationships are not immutable combinations of organ systems are not realized, species did in a special act of creation) were then unavailable. By o teria, the Cuvierian species concept was biologically inte legitimate in 1800. This historical relativity of judgements of biological in serious problem, however, for Kitcher's claim that spe call that under moderate pluralism, only the biologically visions of organismic diversity constitute legitimate sp Cuvierian example illustrates, which divisions are biologica changes dramatically over time without any corresponding organismic world. For the moderate pluralist, Cuvier's ciples constituted a species division in 1800 because they tions extending a legitimate and successful explanator tractable. By the same criteria, however, Cuvier's pro ceptable today.3 Similarly, a species concept defined in ical niches would not have helped extend any successful ex tices of the nineteenth century, and would probably also h and wrongheaded. As we have already seen, however, enterprises of contemporary biology require an ecolog cept.
Thus, what constituted a biologically interesting relation in the past has changed dramatically and we have no obvious reason to believe that it will not continue to do so. This makes Kitcher's realism problematic because legitimate species must then change with the explanatory schemata and practical interests of biologists. Recall that a species concept is not just any division of organisms; it is special in that it helps us investigate our pressing questions and problems. Thus, the very same division of organisms into groups may be biologically interesting (and therefore a species division) at one time, but not at another. Species can vary without any corresponding change in the physical circumstances of the world; that is, species do not supervene on physical circumstances. Instead, divisions of organisms that constitute species depend, for Kitcher, on the legitimate 3Present-day structuralists have attempted to revive ideal morphology and its species concepts (e.g., Rieppel 1988); however, they appeal to theory-free salient structures to ground their fundamental units. The many contemporary biologists and philosophers who reject the notion of theory-free classification as indefensible will view this proposal as wrongheaded.
interests of the biological community at a specific time, and are not independent of the states of particular minds. Kitche requires natural kinds to be objective and permanent, thu demand mind independence (the classical sine qua non for elements of the external world) of his species, as a cond reality. Nonetheless, the historically relative criteria requ moderate pluralism will not permit his species to be real. Wh Kantian metaphysics makes all objects mind dependent in we have established that his pluralist species are dependent u of particular minds, not simply the nature of minds in gene even Kantian reality will not suffer.
Notice that the claim here is not merely that species are no we have changed our minds about them: Precious little under such a strict standard. Rather, the point is that by Kitc criteria, the legitimate interests of biologists constitute thos organisms recognized as species. Thus, as the course of bio proceeds, we do not decide that we were previously mistaken groups of organisms were species; rather, as our explanatory interests change, which divisions of organisms actually are s as well. As we have noted, which principles of division ar interesting can vary without corresponding changes in th ganisms. Kitcher's species therefore lack that property, supe the state of the mind independent material world, which real objects. Kitcher (1991) maintains that his account of explanatory unification as a goal of scientific inquiry grounds an approach to realism which permits both pluralism and realism regarding species. It does so by grounding species concepts in experience in a particular way. We turn now to Kitcher's defense of the reality of species on these grounds. 5. Explanatory Unification and Realism. Kitcher (1991) rejects versions of realism which ascribe common essences to members of natural kinds, as defended, for example by Putnam (1975) and Kripke (1980 His reasons for considering these views problematic include general ep istemic worries, such as how to justify judgements of properties as e sential to certain entities or how to pick out objective similarities. Other problems more specific to particular conceptions of species are how t maintain essentialism in the face of Darwinian evolutionary theory problem noted by Mayr and Sober) and how to justify similarities as "in" nature, rather than projections of our ways of viewing it. Kitcher th explicitly rejects traditional formulations of realism in favor of an alternative predicated on his account of explanatory unification.
According to Kitcher (1989a) , explanatory unification as a goal of sc entific inquiry amounts to maximizing the number of phenom can be explained given a minimal number of argument patt view, natural kinds correspond to the divisions that are pr we attain an ideal systematization of our experience, or the ization of nature. That is, the order of nature is projected b a nonarbitrary fashion. Kitcher (1991) defends the consistency between his plural alism on the basis of this framework. He argues that ideal biology will prove unable to restrict its species concepts d without sustaining corresponding significant losses in explanat Kitcher admits that the difficult investigative work required t these tradeoffs is largely undone but at least points the wa termining whether pluralism is really justified.
The chief flaw in this defense of realism is its dependenc sumptions that species definitions are converging on a final we are at or near the endpoint of this converging series. K the historical relativity/mind-dependence problem by declarin species concepts of one particular time: the end of biology. Th to merit the distinction of being real entities, the species conc ern biology must fulfill two conditions: First, they must be par which is converging toward some endpoint in the ideal limi and second, they must represent either the endpoint of such a series, or something near to it, because:
The explanatory patterns that are objectively correct ar would be properly accepted in the light of an ideally co perience. The natural kinds are the extensions of the pre occur in the instantiations of these patterns over the corpu rationally adopted, given the ideally complete experienc We reserve the title "real" (or "objectively correct") for those patterns and associated natural kinds which are maximally respect to the ideally complete experience. If it were possible t ideal biology tomorrow, but find that all of its species co equally likely to differ from our own as to resemble them, th unification account would provide us with no warrant to call o conceptions "real". Thus the ascription of reality to any co current scientific practice would require a demonstration concepts are converging in the ideal limit of experience, an ally complete experience with respect to the phenomena inv the theory is here or within easy reach. In place of (2), Ki make do with the weaker claim that the concepts generated at an ideally complete experience are identical or very similar currently employed.
Not only are these theses controversial, but what might cou evidence for any of them is unclear. After all, many fertile r cepts, such as Cuvier's immutable species, dominated much tice of their day. Nevertheless, had we accepted Cuvierian in 1800 on Kitcher's grounds, we would have turned out to Notwithstanding the empirical adequacy, explanatory powe fecundity, and other virtues of Cuvierian species, we were no limit of experience in 1800, and we are not sure what mig good reason to suppose that we are today, or even that our co be like those which would arise whenever we do reach such a limit.
Imagining what might count as evidence that species concepts are converging on those of the ideal limit is similarly difficult. Recall that, for Kitcher, convergence does not indicate a reduction in the number of spe cies concepts; rather, convergence represents their approach to a set concepts which maximally unify experience in the ideal limit. We c claim only that species concepts have changed over time; whether t are converging is a question that can only be answered when we kn that the concepts we have at a particular time will never change in sponse to further evidence or experience. To know this, we would h to know in advance what the evidence will be; that is, we could on know if our species concepts were converging on those of the idea complete experience at the end of the ideally complete experience.
A natural defense might claim that we call real whatever maxima unifies the phenomena of our actual experience to date. This avoids many difficulties, but also entails the damaging conclusion that what is r changes over time: That is, Cuvierian species were real in 1800 and a not real now, modern species are real now but might not be real in future. This initially attractive move leaves us with a realism hardly serving the name. The entities generated by a realism relative to particu experiences lack the kind of objectivity (or permanently real status) Kitch wants for natural kinds, and this stronger objectivity condition seems t be his reason for embracing the notion of the ideally complete experien in the first place.
Thus, if Kitcher is to persuade us to share his pluralistic realism, must demonstrate that species concepts are converging and that we at or near the endpoint of the series. In addition, he must show h anything could count as evidence for these claims, since none of the dinary sorts of virtues will do. Instead of belaboring the problems entai by the difficult marriage of Kitcher's pluralism and realism, howeve consider an alternative view which recognizes the insights of Kitch pluralism without engendering the problems of attaching realism to and furthermore, resolves serious puzzles involved in the application species concepts.
6. The Alternative View. Let us begin by granting some organisms and their properties. I would like to claim that spec among these organisms are based on a plurality of interest-rela They are not completely arbitrary, however, in that these int grounds may range only over the recognized properties of or recognized property could in principle provide a species dis the actual species concepts at any given time are those def collective legitimate explanatory and practical interests of community. If the fundamental and interesting questions of b to focus on organisms' means of locomotion, the locomoti might become legitimate-a reasonable and useful way to cut u for study-but as things stand, it is not. This approach relies on the fundamental insight of Kitcher's that there are a multiplicity of legitimate explanatory deman with associated schemata for the division of organisms, b difficulties that plague his realism. In addition, it recognizes t evolution of the biologists' explanatory interests by allowi mate ways to divide organisms under study to evolve with "Species" are thus the designations we use to pick out th and interesting distinctions between groups of organisms at a that is, the differences that we wish to investigate. As previo however, the useful schemata for dividing up organisms are v they shift as the explanatory interests of biologists do, w sponding shifts in the physical world that they organize. Spec independent of the states of particular minds, and are theref or objective in the traditional senses of those terms. They are insofar as they are predicated on antecedently recognized biol erties of organisms, but no particular sort of property need b of a legitimate species concept.
7. Advantages of Rejecting Realism. To this point, I have rejection of realism in order to countenance both a variety of explanatory demands (and associated principles of divisio and the changing nature of these demands. I now turn to s dent reasons to reject realism, namely, the resolution of so that arise for particular species concepts when they are em realist assumptions. I claim that when these realist assumption doned, the features of species concepts which seem proble be so. Splitter (1988) and Kitcher (1989b) express similar concerns about speciation criteria in the BSC.4 Splitter says the BSC does not meet its own 4Although Kitcher actually addresses D. Hull's "historical connectedness" as a criterion for species, he understands Hull to be using reproductive isolation as the division between species. The distinction need not trouble us here. (1988, 338) . Kitcher (1989b) introduces further puzzles about species concepts, including what I call the "Delayed Cataclysm" problem, best illustrated by an example (see figure 7.1). Consider one population of organisms from which a small group becomes geographically isolated. For those who permit only cladistic speciation, whether the original large population of organisms becomes a new species or not depends on whether the small group attains reproductive isolation from them before being wiped out by some cataclysm. That is, no change might occur in the large population, but because the small isolate attained reproductive isolation from them, the ancestral species must be viewed as extinct and both the large and small groups considered new species. Another problem Kitcher introduces I call the "Minimal Speciation" problem (figure 7.2), and it weighs against any scheme of speciation that is proposed (cladistic or otherwise).
Consider d as the minimal distance needed (by whatever criterion for a speciation event) to constitute a separate species. Now consider an an-cestral species A which divides into two daughter species B are d from each other while each is 1/2 d from A. Thus if were to become extinct, we would view the remaining branch nificantly different enough from A to constitute a new species survive, we have two new species and the demise of the an Kitcher's problems assume his (*) principle that "[a] prop lineage-stages as stages of the same species should depend intrinsic properties of and direct relations among those sta give the same results in cases which differ only in the existen erties of organisms occupying a different branch of the li 200). Thus Splitter and Kitcher's problems exhibit a funda larity: Both point out that particular species concepts viol monsense standard (captured by the intrinsic identity and that what happens to something "over here" should not af divide up the world "over there". More specifically, Splitter an principles hold that the coming to be and passing away of an depend only on what happens to that entity and not on wh others.
This formulation, however, clarifies the realist assumption t lies the intrinsic identity criterion and the (*) principle. We s such principles to apply only to real entities, that is, thos stitution is mind independent. Therefore, these principles priate for entire classes of entities: In particular they will fai those entities whose existence and classification are not in our interests and activities. We have already considered a n guments in favor of taking species to be such entities, and th puzzles generated by applying realist metaphysical princip further support this proposal.
What counts as a legitimate species division among organi upon what we find interesting about them, what we wish to e them, and what practical goals we have with respect to them, turn depends upon what other organisms exist in the world a erties they have. We should therefore expect species to vi trinsic identity and (*) principles. We have considered a n dependent arguments in favor of taking species to be the sort which Splitter and Kitcher's realist metaphysical principles do and the conceptual difficulties generated by realism about stitute further support for this proposal. Once species have sh tle of realism, what were intractable puzzles about their behav into smoke and mirrors.
If species are not real entities, it is perfectly reasonable to claim that whether both branches of a population survive is relevant to determining speciation: In the case sketched, the survival of both branches was min-imally necessary to constitute an interesting difference b Similarly, we reject Splitter's demand for an explanation of parent species, independent of formal desirability. Once w alism regarding species, the formally desirable characteris tion are all that remain to be accounted for. Since the parent was a real or independent entity, its demise requires no in planation.
This analysis transcends the boundaries of any particular species concept. Equally reasonable rival answers are permitted to particular cases of either Splitter's or Kitcher's puzzles, depending upon one's speciation criteria. For example, a peripheral isolate from the main body of organisms might count as a separate species if a criterion of reproductive isolation is employed, but not if morphological distinctness is used. In any case, these alternative possibilities no longer offend us once a realist posture toward species is abandoned.
Thus we solve a number of puzzles regarding species divisions and speciation by rejecting that there is anything puzzling about them. Once we recognize that species are not real or mind-independent entities, the assumptions which underlie the demands for explanation posed by Splitter and Kitcher are revealed as inappropriate. The inadequacies arise not in particular species concepts, but rather in the realism about species from which misleading demands for explanation quickly ensue.
